Bright Sword: Construction starts from southeastern Shanxi

Chapter 452



Chapter 452

But this time, faced with this vacancy, the senior generals who had fought for power in the past unexpectedly maintained a rare consensus - they all believed that their current positions were more important, and that it would be more appropriate to choose someone else to command the North China Front Army.

Some people shirked responsibility by saying that "the war situation in the north and the south is tense", some emphasized that their responsibilities at home were more critical, and some simply said ambiguously that "there is no need for mobilization at the moment."

Even those generals who had served in North China avoided this issue and were unwilling to take over this "mess".

The top brass of the headquarters were caught in a dilemma for a while - they had originally planned to take the opportunity to adjust the command of the North China Front Army, but found that no one was willing to take over.

In the end, they had no choice but to give up temporarily and instead appease Tada Shun and let him continue in office to avoid causing chaos in the command system.

For Tada Shun, such a decision is undoubtedly a disguised humiliation.

He originally hoped to retire successfully and return to Tokyo, away from this quagmire of war.

But now, not only can they not escape, but they are intentionally or unintentionally placed by the headquarters on the front line of the war in North China, continuing to struggle in this war with no hope of victory.

He knew very well that his position seemed secure only because no one was willing to take it over.

When the war situation deteriorates further, or when the headquarters really finds a suitable candidate, his ending will probably not be much better than it is now.

This land of North China has become his predicament...

Moreover, the situation in North China in the past six months is not optimistic.

The Eighth Route Army set up guerrilla zones around the clearing areas. After many villages were destroyed, the villagers directly joined the Eighth Route Army and went into the mountains to conduct guerrilla warfare.

In the Hebei Plain, the Japanese army attempted to implement a "cage policy," building a large number of strongholds and blockade ditches in an attempt to trap the Eighth Route Army in the mountains.

However, this method not only failed to cut off the Eighth Route Army's ability to move, but instead gave the Eighth Route Army the opportunity to ambush the Japanese supply lines.

Since the construction of the blockade ditch required a large amount of labor and materials, and the railway transportation in North China had long been affected by the Eighth Route Army's raids, the Japanese army's cage plan eventually progressed slowly and was even forced to be abandoned in some places.

The Japanese army tried to weaken the Eighth Route Army's combat effectiveness by controlling supplies and creating a food crisis.

However, the Eighth Route Army did not rely on the traditional logistics supply system, but established an independent production and supply system.

In many base areas in North China, the Eighth Route Army established cooperatives to encourage the people in the base areas to produce independently and help each other.

Many villages even built their own small arsenals to manufacture simple weapons and ammunition.

In addition, the Eighth Route Army also developed a strict material management system to avoid waste, so that it could maintain its combat effectiveness even under blockade.

In addition, the Eighth Route Army actively implemented a policy of rent and interest reduction in rural areas occupied by the Japanese army, making the living conditions of farmers in the base areas significantly better than those of the people in the areas controlled by the Japanese army.

As a result, the Japanese army's plan to disintegrate the base through economic means completely failed, and instead prompted more farmers to choose to support the Eighth Route Army.

By June 1940, the Eighth Route Army had not only successfully resisted the various new tactics of the Japanese army, but also proactively upgraded its own guerrilla tactics.

Over the past six months, all the troops of the Eighth Route Army, except the 389th Division, launched large-scale attacks on Japanese strongholds, using the strategy of "attacking strongholds, disrupting transportation, and destroying supplies", which put the Japanese army in the occupied areas of North China into a difficult situation.

Especially in the northwest Shanxi region, the Northwest Shanxi Military Region, under the command of Commander He, launched a series of "quick strikes" based on the terrain.

They took advantage of the mobility of lightly armed troops to conduct long-distance raids at night, suddenly attack Japanese strongholds, destroy their supplies, and then quickly evacuate, leaving the Japanese army exhausted.

The Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region turned the mountainous areas into solid fortresses by establishing "Water Margin Liangshan-style" guerrilla bases.

Even if the Japanese army launched a large-scale mopping-up operation, it would be difficult to completely wipe out the Eighth Route Army.

In the Hebei Plain, the Japanese army stationed a large number of troops around the blockade ditch, but the Eighth Route Army implemented the "encirclement and attack" tactics, and repeatedly inflicted heavy damage on the Japanese reinforcement troops.

Faced with the unfavorable situation in the North China war, conflicts began to emerge within the Japanese army.

Some senior military officers believed that the security policy in North China must be adjusted. It could no longer rely on simple military raids, but should strengthen cooperation with the puppet army and use political means to divide the people.

However, the hardliners represented by Yoshio Shinozuka advocated increasing the use of force to suppress the rebellion, and even considered carrying out larger-scale burning, killing and looting throughout North China in order to completely destroy the Eighth Route Army's living space.

In Tokyo, the headquarters was also uneasy about the situation in North China.

As the situation on the European battlefield was changing rapidly, the Japanese military began to consider adjusting its strategy and making emergency preparations between moving north and south.

The failure to resolve the North China battlefield put the Japanese top leaders in a dilemma in their China strategy.

In June 1940, the situation in North China entered a new stage.

The Japanese army's special operations and security warfare strategies failed to work, and the Eighth Route Army not only resisted stubbornly but also further expanded its influence.

This forced the Japanese army to re-examine their tactics, and also made Tokyo begin to consider whether to adjust its overall strategy for the war against China.


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